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A Conversation with Philippe Descola
EDUARDO KOHN
McGill University

The distinguished anthropologist Philippe Descola has worked among the
Jivaroan Achuar in Ecuador’s Amazon region, since the mid-1970s. Author
of numerous influential books and publications, he holds a professorship at the
Collège de France and is also Directeur d’études and Directeur du Laboratoire
d’Anthropologie Sociale at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in
Paris.
EK: I don’t know if I ever told you this, but as a graduate student I was
fortunate to have visited the Achuar; I did a couple of short stints as a
‘naturalist guide’—that was my title—at the Kapawi Ecolodge and Reserve.

PD: Yes, I was in Kapawi myself, but that was long before it was a lodge.
It’s in the midst of Achuar territory. And indeed, some of the Achuar now
working there are people that I knew quite well.
EK: It was quite amazing to enter an Achuar house and find a man
greeting you with a loaded shotgun across his lap, to visit houses that are
fortified because of ongoing feuds, and to stumble across, in the middle
of the forest, a shelter that had recently been used for an arutam vision
quest—all of these things that I had read about in your work. On our way
out I met a man, Domingo Peas, a leader in local and national indigenous
politics—someone very well read and articulate, and also very much part
of the Achuar world. Anyways, he said that he had read your books and

136

Eduardo Kohn

that you were the only outsider to have really gotten things right. He was
like, “you know, he really got it.” And that, I think, is quite a compliment.

PD: I’m very happy to know that. Anne-Christine1 and I really enjoyed
living among the Achuar although we haven’t been back for almost ten
years now. But I would very much like to go back now, if only for personal
reasons, to know what’s going on, to visit friends. I’m working on very
different things now. I’m not sure I’m really an Americanist anymore.
EK: You’re certainly moving beyond a vision of Anthropology as limited to
one geographical area. And yet I see your life work—and you say as much
yourself—as hinging on a fundamental ethnographic insight that came
from living intimately with the Achuar.

PD: Absolutely. I think that anthropologists are always doing something
more than ethnography; we try to understand the general properties of
social life. But we also bring to that task a sort of astonishment in our
experience of the world. And this freshness is something we get from
doing fieldwork. People say that philosophy aims to expand on your
astonishment—on your innocence towards the world. But I think that this
can be said about anthropology as well, and perhaps even more so. Most
of the general anthropological questions I asked myself after the field
were derived from this initial experience. But there’s another dimension
as well. Initially, at least, the notion of society that you work with is very
much linked, not so much to the society you study, but to the contrast
between your own society and the society you study. This exerts a sort of
tension—a dynamic—which helps you carry on with a certain concept
of what a group of people is. But to get back to the first point about my
formative experiences among the Achuar, as you know, I went to the field
with a very general idea of studying the relationship between a society and
its environment. And I made the usual inquiries that people make when
they want to study these kinds of things. But what really made me marvel
was the realization that, although the Achuar certainly recognized certain
discontinuities between humans and non-humans, these discontinuities
were radically different from our own. And this was a bit surprising in an
expected way, but also in an unexpected one. I was expecting this because
I’d read, of course, not only the South American ethnography, but also
Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim and a few others pioneers of our discipline whose
work was entirely devoted to resolve this bizarre scandal, that some people
appear not to make distinctions between humans and non-humans. So, I
was prepared to find that. I was prepared to find it at the level of, as we
would say at the time, ‘representations’ at the level of ways of thinking
about life. But I had no way of understanding how people would actually
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live with this idea and put it into practice, or really experience the world
in this fashion. And this is the discovery. No? It’s not only what people
say; their whole way of life revolved around the fact that they didn’t make
a distinction between nature and society. And this was really the starting
point for everything I’ve done since.
EK: Yes, the shock of actually being in a world where nature doesn’t exist.

PD: Exactly! Where it’s so present for you, but it doesn’t exist for the
people with whom you live. You see?
EK: In a nutshell this is the question that has guided you throughout your
career: How do we deal with this construct of ours—nature—which is
obviously a construct, like so many others, and yet it’s one that remains
invisible to us as such because it’s so ‘natural.’ And so, I think it’s just
wonderfully provocative that the title of your professorship at the Collège
de France is “Chair of the Anthropology of Nature.”
PD: Yes, I chose this precisely because I think the oxymoron is extremely
stimulating intellectually.

EK: Right, just like “human nature,” as you point out in your most recent
book (Descola 2005).

PD: There’s no better way to begin to explore a series of questions than
by an oxymoron. And so this is precisely why I specifically chose this title
(laughing). What’s surprising, as my friend Bruno Latour says, is that my
colleagues at the Collège de France, at the time I was elected, apparently
didn’t, or were not aware of the, uh, how should I put it… I was about to
say revolutionary, but at least the paradoxical attitude toward the social
sciences that this implied.
EK: You’re referring to your colleagues in the social sciences, or your
colleagues also in the natural sciences?

PD: Also in the natural sciences. I was fortunate enough that I was
presented for membership to the Collège de France by a natural scientist,
the neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux, as well as by a social scientist,
the ethnohistorian Nathan Wachtel… Well, it’s a complex story. It would
take hours to explain the workings of this very bizarre institution. But I’m
quite interested in what my colleagues in the natural sciences are doing in
the cognitive domain in general.
EK: I gathered that from your recent book. I mean, you’re trying to link
what anthropologists call schemata with some of the latest findings in the
neurosciences, and your argument also depends on the claim that there
exists a pan-human cognitive propensity to perceive oneself and others
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in terms of some combination of interiority and physicality—for many
socio-cultural anthropologists, such a claim would be considered quite
controversial.

PD: I think that it’s a mistake for anthropologists not to be aware of what’s
going on in science. This is especially true of the cognitive sciences. There’s
always the danger of saying or writing foolish things based on obsolete
knowledge. Or, of tolerating people from these domains—and this is still
very much the case with Evolutionary Psychology—to write very foolish
things that contradict the basic facts and notions that Anthropology has
established
EK: —and that contradict basic tenets of Evolutionary Biology as well, for
that matter.

PD: Yes, exactly. Evolutionary Psychology, and Memetics too, by the way,
are science fictions, because they discard the facts. So, yes, I think that one
should not consider with condescendence these questions of cognition.
And that one should be, well, knowledgeable about them.
EK: Yes, and furthermore, if we really are going to undertake a monistic
Anthropology, as you suggest, then the old dualistic strategy of dividing
and separating—the old strategy of saying, “well, we anthropologists deal
with society, and the biologists, rightly or wrongly, are doing something
else, about which we don’t have to worry,” has got to go. It’s just not tenable.
I mean, if one is to do a truly monistic Anthropology, then it has to be in a
certain kind of a dialogue with the sciences.
PD: Quite right.

EK: I think this might be a good opportunity to discuss more explicitly
Par-delà nature et culture (Beyond Nature and Culture),2 your most recent
book. Anglophone anthropologists are well acquainted with your books,
In the Society of Nature (1994) and The Spears of Twilight (1996). I must say
that my own research was very much influenced by In the Society of Nature.
And I have taught both of these books with great success in my classes.
Par-delà nature et culture really expands on these. You’re taking western
dualism straight on, and trying to show a way out of the dualistic trap that
we’ve set for ourselves—and you do this, in great part, through the insights
you bring to bear on this topic as an Amazonianist. But you really take it
well beyond Amazonia as well.
PD: I was fortunate to have been able to discuss these ideas, over the
years, with a small group of friends and very astute and sharp critics for
the Amazonian material. Among these is Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.
He and I just held a public debate, a sort of “disputatio,” as Bruno Latour
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calls it,3 which is part of an ongoing discussion that we’ve had in Paris,
in Cambridge, in Rio, that spans twenty years. And I was very fortunate
because these discussions really helped to reorganize my arguments. And
the other interlocutor who really helped me a lot was Bruno Latour
EK: —of course—

PD: who’s a friend. As with Eduardo, I agree with him on certain things,
but what’s important, of course, is on what we disagree on, because that’s
what helps me move forward. Tim Ingold is a third important interlocutor.
I also have had many discussions with him over the years. And I admire
him, but at the same time I disagree with him on many points. So, I think
I’m very fortunate to have these three anchoring points as my ‘sparring
partners,’ so to speak. I think that intellectual endeavor and scientific
research is very largely fuelled by controversies, whether public or private,
of this kind.
EK: Yes. Absolutely. There’s a certain kind of productive agonism, which
is important.

PD: Absolutely. We have to share very basic principles, about how to
proceed forward and we need to share a certain way of posing the problems.
But then afterwards, there are differences and discrepancies. And these
differences and discrepancies are what fuel our progress.
EK: Right. I see many connections between your work and, especially, that
of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Bruno Latour. And I see important
foundations for their work in your own. Latour’s We Have Never Been
Modern (1993) depends on a certain ethnographic claim that non-moderns
do not neatly separate humans from non-humans
PD: —yes, yes, of course the Achuar! (laughing)—

EK: I mean it’s really foundational to his whole thesis. I would say the same
about Eduardo.4 His multinaturalism is an extension of your animistic
critique of western naturalism, even though, of course, there are important
differences. So, I see you as having provided an important foundation for
many of the central claims that both these scholars make.
PD: Well, the difference is that—well, there are many differences. But one
of the differences, and Bruno Latour states it well in his presentation of
the “disputatio,” is that I take animism as one ontology among others—
one that should not be privileged but one that should not be discarded
either. Whereas Eduardo is involved in some sort of personal battle
against naturalism, in that perspectivism for him is much more than the
Amazonian version of perspectivism—by which I mean an account of
the non-reciprocal perception of different kinds of beings. For Viveiros
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de Castro perspectivism now goes beyond this and has become a sort of
general philosophy of knowledge, which, as he says, he hopes to hurl as an
explosive device against western epistemology itself. But what still very
much interests me, and what still really animates me, is to try to make
some sense of ethnography in general—to make sense of the bizarre
ways that people do things and to try to understand the compatibilities
and incompatibilities between certain traits and institutions. And so the
general anthropological project is still very much for me in the forefront.
Eduardo has deviated from this. It’s no longer his priority. His priority
is political and epistemological, in the sense of trying to undermine the
foundations of western rationality and epistemology. For me his is more a
philosophical program than an anthropological one.
EK: Yes, I’ve also been thinking about this in terms of Eduardo Viveiros
de Castro. I was first exposed to his work while doing doctoral fieldwork
among the Quichua-speaking Runa, in Ecuador’s Upper Amazon. I
came up to Quito to participate with him, and a whole group of very
interesting Americanists, on a panel at the 1997 Americanists Meetings
on the ‘self ’ organized by Anne-Christine Taylor. I immediately realized
that he really got something, empirically, about how Amazonians see
things. Through his work I began to understand the perspectival shifts
that were ethnographically so evident to me among the Runa, as part of
something broader. So, I appreciate multinaturalism as an ethnographic
reality and especially as a critique of naturalism—a critique of what he calls
“multiculturalism”. And yet… is it more than a convenient, ethnographically
situated, critique of our ‘nature?’
PD: My point is very simple. I think that I have the same difference with
Eduardo as I do with Tim Ingold. I don’t think that one kind of ontology
should be privileged over another. That would amount to a sort of reverse
ethnocentrism, no? Multinaturalism is very interesting in the sense that it
reverts the usual contrasts. But that doesn’t mean that it’s a more relevant
contrast. I mean, it’s not a truer contrast than the other one. The world
is continuous and we can’t get direct access to its essence, only to the
phenomena. And no phenomenon is truer than another one.
EK: This gets at another question that I grapple with in my own work—the
question of ontology—and one that I struggle with in trying to understand
your own work as well. You juxtapose four fundamental ways of relating
to others, especially to non-humans, and you call these “ontologies,” by
which you mean the different “systems of properties that humans ascribe
to beings” (Descola 2006:139). These ontologies vary as to the contrasting
ways in which people ascribe the fundamental qualities of interiority
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(intentionality or selfhood) and physicality (the ways in which bodies
permit action) to beings in the world. Just to recap, the four modes you
identify are: 1) animism, in which differently embodied kinds of humans and
non-humans share a similar interiority, this is exemplified by Amazonian
multinaturalism; 2) naturalism, where humans and nonhumans share a
physicality but only humans have an interiority, a mode best exemplified
by modern western science; 3) totemism, where certain groupings of
humans and non-humans are united because they share interior as well
as physical attributes, a mode found in Aboriginal Australia; and, 4)
analogism, in which humans and non-humans are understood to be made
up of fragmented essences, essences whose relationships can be mapped
onto similarly linked essences possessed by other entities, this is a mode
exemplified, as you note, by the ancient Inca State.

EK: So, although we usually begin our analysis with things like social
organization or culture, and then try to see how these might structure
experience, you’re saying, “there’s something deeper.” Of the four modes
that can inform experience, animism and naturalism are the ones we’re
most familiar with
PD: —for the Amazonianist, at least, yes.

EK: Yes, for the Amazonianist. I very much appreciate the critique of
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cultural relativism that your approach implies. The relativist assumes a
natural ontology and something on top of this—culture, or ‘representation.’
And so she compares the differences among cultures. But you’re saying,
“We first need to ask whether or not nature itself exists.” Culture is no
longer the variable, because nature is no longer stable. I appreciate that
you’re going back to something deeper.
PD: It’s a very simple view, in fact. It’s Humean in a sense, no? I mean
the world is composed of qualities. I’m not interested in the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. What’s interesting to me is that
according to these very basic premises that I’ve sketched in the book, you’ll
be able, most of the time, to elicit some of the qualities, or render explicit
some of the contrasts. But some of these are blocked off—inhibited—
because of the social context within which we’ve been raised. Which
means that there’s only one form of inference that would be stabilized
in a given context; only one form that would give the scheme for which
reality is perceived and acted upon. So, this doesn’t mean that people live
in different worlds. It means that there are certain ways of living in the
world that are partly blocked off. The qualities emerge via the interaction
between the subjects that perceive and act upon the world, and the specific
physical properties of the world itself. This isn’t a representation or a
construction. It’s an actualization of properties against certain lines that
are favored, or blocked, or inhibited according to the basic assumptions
you make about the qualities of things, especially in regard to what I call
interiority and physicality. The different ways in which interiority and
physicality are juxtaposed and weighted give each of these four ontologies
their distinctive properties. Along these lines, you know, the philosopher
Michel Serres, has just written a book, which is an exploration of the four
ontologies I’ve isolated.
EK: Oh really? That’s exciting! What’s it called?

PD: It has a very long title. It’s called Écrivains, savants et philosophes font
le tour du monde (2009). And apparently, somebody told me, he devoted
several seminars at Stanford on it. He chooses within the western world
certain philosophers, writers, and artists and tries to see how each of them
is rather more a totemist or more an analogist, etc., which is an interesting
endeavor. And it’s quite natural because art, or certain kinds of reflexive
thought, or philosophy, enjoy a certain degree of freedom, which affords
the possibility of stepping into different ontologies, divorced from the one
in which you were born. And so, in that sense it’s obvious, for example, that
Leibniz is an analogist in many respects, etc., etc.

EK: Right, these ontological modes are not just contextually bounded.
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They can travel. It’s sort of shamanistic. I mean, Amazonians can come to
inhabit different kinds of bodies, each implying a different way of being in
the world. Right?
PD: Yes.

EK: Maybe this is a kind of intellectual shamanism, a form of travel among
modes of being that’s possible precisely because these ontologies aren’t
reducible to an all-encompassing social sphere.

PD: Exactly, and not reducible to culture, to worldview, or to things like
that—precisely. That’s my main point. And yet… I mean, when you write
a book, you find (laughing) that anything you write can be appropriated
and taken away from you and can acquire a life of it’s own. And so it’s very
difficult to struggle against the misapprehension of what you’ve written.
But still, one of the misunderstandings of my work that I’m trying to fight,
is the idea that what I’ve done in this book is to provide Anthropology
with a way to classify societies, which is absolutely not my intention. I
view my project more as a kind of experimental machine, which allows me
to capture certain kinds of phenomena and to organize them, within, of
course, a framework that helps us understand how these phenomena can
be accounted for. And this helps me to understand certain basic principles
that will allow the combination of certain things, but not the combination
of others. I find it very interesting, not to classify but to try to discover the
basic differences among things, which appear on a continuum. You know,
I’ve been working for the last few years on images. And I’m preparing a
book on that right now.
EK: Really?

PD: And I’ve found that these four ontologies really help to understand
figuration and imagery. They help explain why certain kinds of images are
being made in some places and not in others, for instance.

EK: That’s fascinating. So, these modes can really travel analytically as well,
beyond Anthropology.
PD: Precisely.

EK: I want to go back to the question of ontology for a moment. I’m still
struggling in my own work with what we mean by ontology. Like yours,
the book I’m writing is also an attempt to come to grips with the problem
of dualism and the question of how best to understand nature. Through
my study of the ways in which the Runa relate to the many kinds of
beings that inhabit the forest, I’m looking for some way out of the implicit
dualism that pervades virtually all our modes of analysis. This question
of ontology, maybe I can ask it this way. You’re not making a historical
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claim about these four modes. If these were cultural modes, you might
make a diffusionist argument to account for their distribution across the
globe. Right? You know… “Sub-arctic peoples are historically related to
Amazonians and therefore they share a way of being.” That would be a
cultural explanation. You’re obviously not doing that. And yet, how do you
account for the fact that these modes of beings map onto the world in a
particular way? Why are there four modes of being and not more? Why are
so many Amazonians animists?

PD: (laughing) Well, I think that… I called them somewhere archipelagos
precisely to emphasize the fact that these ontologies are spatially
discontinuous. I think they reflect—I was about to say, basic choices.
They’re not quite that, of course, or they’re choices in the sense that we
talk of technological choices—in the sense that they’re the actualization
and adoption of premises that are not really thought about. But are
there material conditions that favor the actualization of one system over
another? I should think the reverse. It is because of the actualization of
these ontologies that certain paths, certain options, are taken. This is why
you end up with certain specific social formations and even technological
choices. It’s not society or technology that determines ontology, but the
other way around.
EK: I see.

PD: Of course, you don’t always find these in their pure states. Some
ontologies have changed, and evolved towards different systems. As we
know from the Americas, especially South America, there are vast areas
where the ontologies are in a state of hybridity. There’s a clear contrast
between the analogist world of the highlands and the animic world of the
lowlands. But there’s also an arc spreading northwest, along the foothills
of the Andes, extending through Colombia, among what was called in the
Handbook of South American Indians the “circum- Caribbean tribes,” no?
EK: Yes.

PD: Where there’s a mixture; certain aspects are obviously animic and
other aspects are obviously analogic. You find that really clearly in the
northwest Amazon among people like the Witoto, and the Bora. These
are, I think, very interesting examples because they show us to what degree
things can combine before the mode switches to something else. I think
that you would find exactly the same type of thing in Southeast Asia. The
highland population in Vietnam, for instance, would differ a lot from the
main ethnic Vietnamese population. And this is something you find also
in Malaysia as well. And, of course, the peaceful cohabitation among these
peoples meant that there are certain traits that have migrated. And if they
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are accepted, it means that they’re compatible with the structure of the
existing ontology and everything that goes with it.

EK: Right. Let me just return back to the Amazonian mode for a moment.
I very much appreciate all of the work you’ve done to rethink animism.
But, here’s a question: Just as we take seriously the Achuar claim that
there is no nature, what if we seriously entertain the equally widespread
Amazonian notion that animals have souls. In other words, regardless
whether or not different people ascribe this property to them, do animals
have souls?

PD: You see, when I lecture for a public audience, not necessarily an
academic one, people aren’t surprised at all. They say, “What’s the big deal
about animals having souls, my rose bush has a soul too.” And these are
nice little old ladies (laughing). So it’s a perfectly accepted notion in a way,
but it’s never taken to its utmost consequences here. The idea that there
might be some sort of interiority or intentionality, let’s say, in the wider
non-human realm, is a common assumption throughout the world.
EK: One that might also correspond to something about the way the world
is: animacy exists beyond humans.

PD: But, some people take seriously the consequences that this implies,
and others try to downplay them. And so in our ontology, people have
downplayed the consequences. But that doesn’t prevent people from
perceiving in certain non-humans, some qualities, some properties, that
allow them to make inferences about non-human internal states, and
that make possible some form of communication, or empathy, with them.
But only the animic societies have taken this seriously, in the sense that
they’ve explored all the consequences of treating non-humans as animate
in this way. They’ve admitted that it’s legitimate and they’ve explored and
elaborated on the consequences of it. In other situations, this isn’t the
case. Aboriginal Australians don’t think in these terms. But this doesn’t
mean that they can’t relate to animals, only that they’ve downplayed this
—inhibited it. It’s not a question of whether it’s right or wrong to say that
animals have souls, it’s only that… there’s a universal inference that’s either
favored or inhibited according to the ontological context.
EK: Right. Right, so I guess the question is: In a place like Amazonia
under what circumstances would these sorts of inferences get validated
and magnified?

PD: Well, I think that what gives an empirical basis for sustaining and
reinforcing this idea is hunting.
EK: Yes!
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PD: I say it’s not an explanation; Australians, also hunt. But the basic
thing about hunting is that you put yourself in the position of the prey.
Anyone who hunts anywhere in the world would say this. So, this ability
to exchange positions, I think, is the basis for perspectivism. At least, this is
a huge phenomenological basis for perspectivism. But I think the question
is not why Amazonians have developed this, but why others have departed
from it.
EK: So it’s not so much animic hunters that interest you but accounting
for all those hunters that aren’t animists.

PD: Exactly. There’s a phenomenological basis for animism, but that’s
not enough. I think hunting just provides further proof; it renders things
obvious, no? But it’s not enough.
EK: So, do animals have souls?

PD: The problem of the soul, is a bit…

EK: ‘Soul’ is a very loaded word. The point is, if other kinds of beings are
indeed animate—and this is what, I think, this question about the status
of non-human souls captures—and we relate to them based on this fact,
then the terms of our engagement with them will be set, not only by our
different modalities of ascribing properties to them, but also by the fact
that these other kinds of beings will see us in different ways, and in ways
that matter—vitally—to us. And this—and here I agree with Eduardo, but
only in his initial privileging of animism—radically changes the stakes and
methods of Anthropology. Animism forces us to come to grips with the
fact that we humans are not the only ones who know the world. Therefore,
our human-centered analytics—those that underpin all of the human
sciences as well as the basis for its division from the natural ones—have
to be rethought to show how the human is open to these other ways of
knowing, and being, in the world. This, as I see it, is why animism, and
non-human “souls,” are so important.
PD: Soul is a loaded word.
EK: Yes, of course.

PD: You know that Aristotle and a whole philosophical tradition in Europe
up until the eighteenth century proposed different kinds of souls. Animals
had some kind of soul, but they were different from the human kind. So, if
we take soul in the Amazonian sense, that is, as a capacity to communicate
with non-specifics and to see the world as a subject, I think that anyone
can admit to that. If you take soul in that sense, yes, I should think so.

EK: I guess the reverse is more interesting: How does it come to be that
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someone might claim that an animal is a machine? That’s a more interesting
question.

PD: It’s a more interesting question, yes, because it’s counterintuitive.
Saying that an animal is a machine is counterintuitive. It’s part also of a
general process of physical explanation, which implies discarding certain
qualities of the animal in order to foster this point of view. So, in a sense
naturalism is perhaps more bizarre and counterintuitive then one might
think. People like Pascal Boyer insist on the counterintuitive nature of
religious ideas, but we don’t take seriously enough the extraordinarily
counterintuitive dimension of scientific thought—of rational thought.
EK: Precisely, seen in the context of these other modes, our familiar
naturalism begins to look a bit strange.

PD: You know, Anthropology is such a difficult science because we’re
never consistent. We’re humans, no? We constantly change positions.
At the moment I’m a naturalist and yet I’m perfectly prepared to have
empathy with my cat, even though I don’t have misgivings about eating
meat, and this, despite the fact that I know quite well the deplorable
conditions under which cattle are raised and slaughtered. So, I think that
Achuar hunters also constantly shift between different ontologies. If we
portray Amazonian people as animists or perspectivists, it’s because we
choose to emphasize certain things that contrast the most vis-à-vis our
own. We could treat them as ‘shopkeepers,’ and it would not be entirely
false, either. In many instances we could ascribe their behavior to some
form of personal maximization. Well, shopkeepers, no?
EK: Yes. Rational actors.

PD: Rational actors, maximizing their interests, and so on and so forth.
This is why I’ve said that these ontologies are, for me, an experimental
machine. Anthropology is an experimental machine in that respect also.
We select the information we gather so as to highlight the differences. But
we could also choose the reverse, although it would be less interesting, of
course.
EK: Right. Your current project has an important ethical dimension. A
certain kind of ethics grows out of a monistic Anthropology in which nature
and society aren’t cut off from each other. What kind of environmentalism
is possible when there’s no longer a nature to protect?

PD: Yes.The dissociation of nature from everything else has its consequences.
The extraordinary greed with which modern societies (capitalist, as well as
socialist, and post-socialist) have devoured natural resources is a byproduct
of naturalism. And how you treat non-humans is a good indication of how
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you’ll treat humans. So, in that respect, yes, any reform of the way we still
exploit non-humans—as goods and resources—will be a good indicator
of how much we’re willing to change relationships among humans. So, I
think it’s a very general project; these things cannot be separated. People
tend to say that we have to deal with human rights and freedoms before we
can really start thinking about how we’re going to deal with non-humans,
but I think the two are closely linked.

EK: The two are closely linked, especially if one takes seriously the idea
that there are many kinds of subjects out there. How do we think about
justice when our unit of analysis is no longer a human social entity but
a “collective,” as you call it, that extends beyond species lines? It’s a real
challenge to imagine an ethics that also extends to non-humans. As
a consequence of your critique of naturalism, part of your approach to
this involves a search for a way of limiting, as much as this is possible,
our objectification of other kinds of subjects. Of course, since so much of
interspecies relating revolves around killing, this is never fully attainable,
nor, necessarily desirable.
PD: In a way, what I call relative universalism is also a form of ethics. There
are some forms of relations that are acceptable, probably for everyone, and
others that are unacceptable, also, probably, for everyone. And it’s not very
far from an eco-centric ethics, such as the ones advocated by Aldo Leopold
or J. Baird Callicot, for instance. The idea that the world, the biosphere,
in a very direct sense of the term, and something even wider than that, is
a huge combination of networks, of entities and that those entities with
the greatest ability to perturb or disrupt the networks also have the most
responsibility for trying to sustain it. And so, of course, this responsibility
falls upon humans. And I think that this is an idea that is also quite
common—of course not in this specific form—in many animist societies.
EK: Yes.

PD: Yet, the problem is that… but this would require a long discussion
(laughing), it’s also true that—well, the history of humanity just shows
this—it’s very difficult to think through the consequences of your actions
before the fact, even when, in some sense, you already know what the
consequences will be. I remember talks I gave, years ago, to the leaders of
the Shuar Federation, about cattle raising. I tried to convince them that
although it provided short-term cash, it wasn’t a very good idea, ecologically
or economically, for the long-term. They’d listen politely, but the day-today pressure to make money and to secure land-rights led them to opt
for cattle. It was very difficult. I mean, it’s very hard to share your own
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historical experience with people who have not had those experiences…
It’s one of the disappointing things in life, you know, I mean, it just doesn’t
work. You need to experience these things for yourself in order to change.
You can’t just listen to advice if you haven’t experienced some of these
things for yourself. And so it’s very frustrating trying to advise, or to be a
compagnon de route, as we say in French, to the indigenous organizations
because of that.
EK: Yes. This just reminds me, and maybe we should end on this note, of
a conversation I had many years later with one of those Shuar Federation
leaders you talked to. I was trying to explain to him Eduardo’s take on
perspectivism. And he asked me a question that I wasn’t fully able to
answer, which I think very much prefigures your critique of perspectivism.5
When I presented to him the familiar perspectival image of a jaguar seeing
the blood of his prey as manioc beer, he thought for a moment and then
replied: “Yes, but when a white man drinks Coca-Cola what does he see
it as?”
PD: (laughing) That’s very good!

EK: Which, actually, is exactly what you’re saying: Animism is pervasive—
what defines whiteness is a kind of body that would relate to Coca-Cola in
the same way that a Shuar would related to manioc beer, or, for that matter,
a jaguar to blood—and yet perspectivism isn’t fully reciprocal; it doesn’t
work in every direction; and it doesn’t apply to all situations. Anyways, I
thought that was a very profound—and animic—response from a Shuar
man to this whole business.
PD: A very good answer, indeed. It is “l’ethnographie sauvage” at its best
(laughing).
NOTES
1. The anthropologist Anne-Christine Taylor, author of numerous important
publications on the Achuar and other ethnological matters, currently directs
research and teaching at the Musée de quai Branly in Paris and is also Research
Director at CNRS.
2. To be published in English through The University of Chicago Press. An
English language synthesis of the main arguments of the book also appears in
Descola (2006).
3. See Latour (2009)
4. See especially Viveiros de Castro (1998).
5. See Descola (2005: 199-202)
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